报告人:郭先平(中山大学)
报告时间:2026年11月21日(星期六)8:30-10:00
报告地点:科技楼南楼711会议室
报告摘要:In this talk we consider a two-person zero-sum stochastic game, which must terminate when either player quits the game or a state of the game first enters a prescribed target set. The performance criterion is the probability that the total reward reaches a given threshold. First, under a mild condition, we prove the existence of the value and a Nash equilibrium of the game by developing a comparison theorem. Second, for solving the game with infinite states, we develop a finite-state approximation method based on truncation, and derive explicit error bounds between the values of the truncated and original games. Third, using the error bounds, we design an effective algorithm, by which we can not only obtain any approximation of the value and Nash equilibria of the original game, but also provide convergence analysis of the approximation. Finally, a queueing example is used to illustrate the advantage of our condition and the effectiveness of our algorithm.
报告人简介:郭先平,教授,博士生导师,国家级人才项目获得者(2009年)。1996年于中南大学获博士学位,2002年于中山大学晋升为教授,2003年入选教育部优秀青年教师资助计划,2004年入选教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划,2010年被评为珠江学者特聘教授。担(曾)任国际(SCI)杂志 Advances in Applied Probability,Journal of Applied Probability,Science China Mathematics,Journal of Dynamics and Games,及国内期刊《中国科学:数学》、《应用数学学报》、《应用概率统计》、《运筹学学报》等杂志编委。研究兴趣为马氏决策过程、随机博弈、风险控制、排队优化等。
邀请人:吴付科